![]() ![]() When considering the filibuster as a supermajority requirement for regular legislation, it is clearly unconstitutional. Silent filibusters are a complete perversion of the filibusters’ deliberative potential and prove that the process functions as nothing more than a three-fifths majority requirement for regular legislation. “Silent filibusters” allow senators to block legislation without debate by merely voicing their intent to filibuster. In an even more flagrant deviation from the filibusters’ supposed deliberative function, filibustering today usually does not even require debate. At worst, it shuts down debate and stalls the Senate, delaying or blocking legislation. After exhausting relevant topics, which are rarely genuine efforts for further deliberation, speeches often devolve into unrelated topics that range from discussions of salad dressing recipes to recitations of each states’ voting laws.Īt best, today’s filibuster sees senators belaboring well-known objections to bills. Filibusters have become less about debate and more about grandstanding for media attention or simply killing time to stall a bill. For more than a century, senators have exploited cloture rules to stall Congress or block legislation altogether. However, the filibusters’ debate-promoting potential is inextricable from, and ultimately overshadowed by, its obstructionist implementation. ![]() Furthermore, the filibuster may enhance protections of minority interests and promote consensus, producing more agreeable and thorough legislation. Although the Constitution makes no mention of a filibuster, the process has a long history dating back to 1806, which some argue proves its legitimacy. Despite its potential for abuse, the filibuster, fundamentally a mechanism to continue debate, embodies the Senate’s deliberative nature. Many scholars argue that cloture requirements reflect many of the principles underlying the Senate. ![]() As legal scholar Michael Gerhardt argues, “the filibuster derives its principle authority from the Senate’s express power to design its own procedural rules to govern its internal affairs.” At its core, the filibuster regulates internal procedure, and thus the supermajority requirement for cloture is well within the Senate’s power. The text of the Constitution and the history of Congress suggest that the filibuster as a debate-enhancing mechanism is constitutional. In its current form, the filibuster is unconstitutional because it disrupts the Senate’s legislative process as outlined in the Constitution and has feeble historical support. I argue that the filibuster in its original, purest sense is constitutional, but that is not the filibuster we have today. While the debate over the filibuster typically centers on its impact on governance, a different debate has been simmering among legal scholars for years: is the filibuster even constitutional? After all, the filibuster is not authorized in the Constitution, nor is it expressly prohibited. The filibuster is the process by which a minority of senators delay or prevent a vote on legislation by speaking as long as possible on the Senate floor, until three-fifths of the Senate invoke cloture, which moves the chamber to a vote. Publisher: Temple University Press,U.S.In recent years, congressional gridlock has focused national attention on the Senate’s filibuster. It offers a unique explanation of why and how special interests dominate American national politics. Demonstrating the wide applicability of the theory, the book traces politiciansa behavior on a wide range of issues, including the Cuban trade embargo, the extension of hate crimes legislation to protect gays and lesbians, the renewal of the assault weapons ban, abortion politics, and Congressas battle to recognize the Armenian genocide. Tyranny of the Minority provides a aunified theory of representation,a based in social psychology and supported by extensive analyses of legislatorsa voting behavior, that explains how citizensa knowledge and participation affects candidatesa behaviour in campaigns and legislatorsa behaviour in Congress. Why do politicians frequently heed the preferences of small groups of citizens over those of the general public? Breaking new theoretical ground, Benjamin Bishin explains how the desires of small groups, which he calls asubconstituencies,a often trump the preferences of much larger groups. ![]()
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